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Abstract
Reliability is an important concern in the development of software for modern sys-
tems. Some researchers have hypothesized that particular fault-handling approaches
or techniques are so effective that other approaches or techniques are superfluous.
The authors have performed a study that compares two major approaches to the
improvement of software, software fault elimination and software fault tolerance, by
examination of the fault detection obtained by five techniques: run-time assertions,
multi-version voting, functional testing augmented by structural testing, code read-
ing by stepwise abstraction, and static data-flow analysis. This study has focused
on characterizing the sets of faults detected by the techniques and on characterizing
the relationships between these sets of faults. The results of the study show that
none of the techniques studied is necessarily redundant to any combination of the
^his work has been partially supported by NASA Grant NAG- 1-668, NSF Grant DCR-
8521398, a MICRO grant co-funded by TRW and the State of California, and the Naval Postgrad-
uate School Research Council
others. Further results reveal strengths and weaknesses in the fault detection by
the techniques studied and suggest directions for future research.
Key words: Assertions, Back-To- Back Testing, Code Reading, Evaluation of soft-
ware methodologies, Fault elimination, Fault tolerance, N-version programming,
Software experiments, Static analysis, Testing
1 Introduction
Reliability is an important concern in the development of software for modern sys-
tems. Software reliability improvement techniques may be classified according to
the approach they use to deal with faults (source-code defects): 1) fault-avoidance
techniques attempt to prevent the introduction of faults into software during devel-
opment; 2) fault-elimination techniques attempt to locate and remove faults from
software prior to its use; 3) fault-tolerance techniques attempt to prevent faults
from causing a program to fail.
Some researchers have hypothesized that particular fault-handling approaches
or techniques are so effective that other approaches or techniques are superfluous.
It seems important to investigate these hypotheses and, in general, to study the
relationship between techniques that use different fault-handling approaches. Such
studies provide direction for improving the techniques and for selecting a set of
techniques for use on a particular project.
Research is continuing into ways to evaluate and improve various software fault-
handling techniques. However, the empirical studies examining these techniques
have largely compared them solely on the number of faults detected, rather than
examining the relationship between the sets of faults detected by the techniques.
An experiment that examines the intersection of the sets of faults detected by
various techniques may reveal new limitations of these techniques, suggest research
directions to extend their utility, and provide comparative information.
The authors have performed such a study, contrasting the fault detection capa-
bility of a variety of software fault-tolerance and fault-elimination techniques includ-
ing n-version programming, run-time assertions, functional testing augmented by
structural testing, code reading by stepwise abstraction and static data-flow analy-
sis. These techniques were selected for both practical and theoretical reasons. From
a theoretical point of view, each of these techniques follow different approaches to
the detection of faults, so a broad examination of fault detection is achieved. From
a practical point of view, each of these techniques is relatively easy to use, and each
technique is within the capability of undergraduate student participants. Each of
these techniques have also been examined in previous empirical studies, so compar-
ison of the results of this study with the results of other researchers is possible.
One of the techniques that have been studied empirically is n-version program-
ming. These studies have often revealed limitations in this technique. Despite
discouraging empirical results, n-version programming is gaining acceptance among
software developers: n-version programming has been used in software to control
aircraft [30] and railroadsflS] and has been proposed for nuclear power plants[17].
One drawback to the multiversion technique is that the total development costs are
increased due to the costs of developing multiple versions. Since in most situations
there is a fixed amount of resources that can be invested in building the software
there must be saving somewhere else in order to allow multiple-version development.
In order to make the technique affordable, it has been suggested that n-version
programming will be so effective that it can be used as a partial substitute for cur-
rent software verification and validation procedures [3]. Instead of extensive V&V
of a single program, Avizienis and Kelly[4] suggest that independent versions can
be executed in an operational environment and V&V completed while using the
software. Furthermore, by employing hobbyist programmers to write multiple soft-
ware versions for critical systems at home, they suggest it will be possible to relax
the need for rigorous quality control and centralized programming environments.
Although it is difficult to believe that anyone would take these latter suggestions
seriously, the need to reduce costs when developing multiple versions has led to at
least one attempt to reduce testing of safety-critical software for commercial aircraft
based on the argument that the use of n-version programming provides such high
reliability that unit testing can be reduced But the hypothesis that testing can be
reduced in multiversion software needs to be carefully examined, both empirically
and theoretically, before modifying current software development practices. No such
evaluation has yet been performed.
The goal of our study is to compare some fault elimination and fault- tolerance
techniques in terms of faults detected in order to provide data on the issues and
questions raised by previous experiments. After a survey of the relevant research,
this paper describes the experimental procedure used in our study, characterizes the




There are a large number of studies examining software testing. Much of the re-
cent work has focused on assessing the effectiveness of various testing techniques.
Myers[27] did a comparative study of functional testing against code reading for
fault detection in small FORTRAN programs. The code-reading methodology used
was an informal desk check conducted by 3 participants. Myers found a wide vari-
ation between individuals, but no significant difference between the performance of
the two techniques.
A study by Hetzel[19] compared code reading, structural testing and functional
testing in terms of the faults detected by each technique. In that study, 39 ex-
perienced subjects tested three PL/I programs ranging in length from 64 to 170
statements. The programs were a sequential series of nested data transformations.
The code-reading technique used in the study, developed by Hetzel, exploited this
structure to summarize the effect of the programs by summarizing the effect of each
transformation. The structural-testing criterion used was statement coverage. The
study found that functional testing discovered the most faults and code reading the
least, with structural testing falling in between. Code reading detected faults for
which test cases are hard to derive, and it detected initialization faults.
Basili and Selby[6] compared code reading by stepwise abstraction with func-
tional and structural testing in four small programs (145 to 365 lines long) written in
an Algol-like language. Three of the programs contained naturally-occurring faults.
while the fourth contained a mixture of naturally-occurring and seeded faults. The
structural-testing criterion used was statement coverage. Functional testing used
equivalence partitioning and boundary- value analysis.
In the Basili and Selby study, code reading by stepwise abstraction detected more
faults than either of the other techniques studied. Structural testing detected fewer
faults than functional testing. The study also compared the types of faults detected
by each method using two classification schemes: omission vs. commission and
the type of operation in which the fault was present (initialization, control, data,
computation, interface or output). Code reading and functional testing detected
insignificantly different numbers of each class of faults except interface faults, where
code reading detected significantly more, and control faults, where functional testing
detected significantly more. In each case, the structural testing detected either
significantly less, or insignificantly different numbers of faults of each type. The
study did not provide information on the size of the intersections of the sets of
faults detected by each method nor on the sets of faults detected by combinations
of methods.
Girgis and Woodward[16] compared the fault-detection abilities of four types of
testing: weak mutation testing, data-flow testing, control-flow testing and static
data-flow analysis. The comparison used a set of small FORTRAN programs (text-
book examples) that were seeded with faults one at a time by an automated tool,
then tested until either the seeded fault was detected or the testing criteria were
satisfied. The results indicate a large variation in the effectiveness of the testing
criteria. Analysis of the experimental data shows an insignificant difference between
the four groups, due to the large variation between the criteria in each group. The
differences between the individual criteria were significant. The most effective crite-
rion was All-LCSAJs (Linear Code Sequence and Jump). However, this study failed
to indicate if this effectiveness result was due to the choice of faults seeded in the
programs or to characteristics of the detection techniques (e.g., the seeding strategy
may have favored All-LCSAJs). Moreover, the results may have been influenced by
the particular testing strategies of each type used.
Ramamoorthy and Ho[29] studied two forms of static data-flow analysis on large
FORTRAN programs. Their results confirmed the limitations of static data-flow
analysis, but faults were detected during their experiment. In the 2,000 line pro-
gram analyzed in that study, simple static data-flow analysis (analysis for unreach-
able code, interface inconsistencies and locally-uninitialized variables) detected four
faults. In a separate 23,000 line program, a more comprehensive static data-flow
analysis (performing more thorough uninitialized-variable checking, loop-increment
checking and analysis for branch anomalies) detected 20 faults.
There have been proposals to use multi-version voting in the testing process
[7, 8, 28, 31]. In this method, known as back-to-back testing, the vote itself is used
as the test oracle, and therefore a larger number of tests can be executed. The
underlying assumptions here are that (1) given that a fault leads to an erroneous
output it will be detected by the voting process, and (2) the faults that would
have been detected by other testing techniques, such as structural testing or static
analysis techniques, will be elicited and detected by voting on random or functional
test cases alone.
A study by Bishop et. al.[7] examined back-to-back testing by varying the speci-
fication language, development practices and implementation language used for the
versions. Three professionally-developed versions were used and seven faults were
detected by back-to-back testing, after an initial acceptance test. Of the seven
faults, two were common between two of the three versions used. No independent
method of verification of the results was used so three-way failures could not be
detected. However, these results are difficult to interpret due to two factors. The
experiment used a small number of versions, which causes the results to be strongly
affected by characteristics of the individual versions, with no capability of identifying
what characteristics are due to the different techniques that produced the versions.
The experiment also lacked isolation between independent variables. Two of the
versions were coded in the same implementation language (FORTRAN 77). One of
these two and the third version used a common specification (jointly prepared), but
all three used different design methods. This design cannot distinguish between the
effects of varying design methods and the effects of different language-specification
mixtures.
Given the contradictory results of previous studies, it appears that no simple
rules exist for choosing among these testing techniques. Furthermore, while relative
comparisons of number of errors detected provide some basis for choosing between
mutually exclusive alternatives, this is not necessarily the situation with respect to
testing. Although limited resources and time usually forces limitations in the total
amount of testing performed, one would probably want to apply more than one
method for detecting software faults. It would be helpful to have information on the
degree to which two techniques are complementary, i.e., detect different errors, or
redundant, i.e., detect the same errors, along with more detailed information about
the particular errors (and hopefully classes of errors) detected and not detected.
Some of this information can be derived bv theoretical analvsis while some will
require empirical study since human behavior and capabilities are involved for which
few adequate models exist.
2.2 Fault-Tolerance Experiments
There have been very few experiments that have explored the use of assertions
for fault tolerance. A study by Anderson [2] applied recovery blocks, which use
assertions to test the system state, to a real-time control system. The code (a
professionally-implemented version of a submarine-control program) was 8000 lines
long and organized into 14 concurrent activities. The results showed that while
assertions were quite difficult to formulate, some reliability improvement was gained
through the use of recovery blocks.
Using software from a voting experiment [22], Leveson, Cha, Knight and Shimeall
[24] had a set of 24 students instrument eight versions of a Pascal program (varying
in length from 400 to 800 lines). These versions were all known to produce cor-
rect results in excess of 99.5% of the time. The investigators had the participants
plan their augmentation of the source code working strictly from the specification
and then proceed to augment the code with the planned assertions, plus any other
assertions the participants desired. The investigators tested the 24 instrumented
programs using random data as well as data on which the original versions were
known to fail. The assertions detected only 14 of the 60 known faults in the 24
instrumented versions. However, assertions detected 6 additional faults (not previ-
ously known). Examining the cases where known faults were not detected revealed
three causes for ineffective checks: bad check placement, bad check condition, and
use of faulty code from the original version in the check. These results show that
assertions are effective in detecting faults even in software of relatively high quality.
In this study, the assertions found as many faults as voting (but largely different
faults). Lastly, the results showed that specif]cat ion-based checks alone were not as
effective as using them together with code-based checks.
There have been several experiments involving the use of n-version programming.
The first, by Chen[12], provided little information because of difficulties in executing
the experiment. However, it was noted that 10% of the test cases caused failures
for the 3-version systems (35 failures in 384 test cases). Chen reported that there
were several types of design faults that were not well tolerated in this experiment,
in particular missing-case logic faults.
Avizienis and Kelly[4] examined the use of multiple specification languages in
developing multi-version software. The reported data indicates that in over 20%
of 100 test cases executed, the three version-systems were unable to agree or voted
on a wrong answer. In addition, 11 of the 18 programs aborted on invalid input.
Despite these results, they conclude that "By combining software versions that
have not been subjected to V&V testing to produce highly reliable multiversion
software, we may be able to decrease cost while increasing reliability.'" The data
in this experiment does not support the hypothesis implicit in this statement that
high reliability will be achieved by using this technique on software that has not
been rigorously tested. They continue to say that "Most errors in the software
versions will be detected by the decision algorithm during on-line production use of
the system." There were 816 combinations of the programs in this experiment each
run on 100 test cases for a total of 81,600 calculated results. In 5.6%. of the cases
where an error occurred in at least one version, the error was not detected bv the
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voting procedure, i.e., the programs agreed on a wrong answer.
Another experiment, by Knight and Leveson[23], found that with 27 programs
run on 1,000,000 test cases, an error was not detected by voting three versions in
35% of the cases where an error actually occurred. The individual programs in
this experiment had a much higher average reliability than in the Kelly experiment
(i.e., 0.9993 versus 0.72) indicating that they were more thoroughly tested before
being subjected to the voting procedure. The results provide some justification for
hypothesizing that faults leading to correlated failures are more likely to escape
detection during testing than faults that do not lead to correlated failures.
Knight and Leveson[22] investigated the problems of common failures between
independently-produced versions and have also looked at reliability improvements
[23]. Although the failure probability was decreased (about 10 times) using three-
version voting compared to single versions in the latter study, this comparison may
not be a realistic one. It is reasonable to expect that applying some reliability-en-
hancing technique would produce an improvement over not applying any special
techniques. A more realistic comparison is to examine the reliability of multiple
versions voted together versus the reliability of a single version with additional
reliability-enhancement techniques applied.
Although it was not the original goal, there is a study that provides one data
point in this comparison. Brunelle and Eckhardt[ll] took a portion of the SIFT
operating system, which was written from a formally-verified design at SRI[26], and
ran it in a three-way voting scheme with two new (non-formally verified) versions.
The results showed that although no faults were found in the original SRI version,
there were instances where the two unverified versions outvoted the correct, verified
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version to produce a wrong answer2 . Care must be taken in using this data because
the qualifications of the implementors of the three versions may be different.
A study by Avizienis, Liu and Shiitz[5] tried to examine the use of multiple im-
plementation languages in n-version programming. Six versions of a flight-control
program were implemented separately (one in each of six languages) and executed
in triplets to look for faults. It is difficult to use the results of this experiment to
understand n-version programming, since a detailed design specification (including
the algorithms to be used and the form of the internal state) was included as part
of the problem specification. Since there was minimal design diversity, there was
unlikely to be detection of design errors, only coding errors or typographical errors.
For example, two of the versions were found to be erroneous because a hand-written
value of 65,536 was misread as 65.536. Furthermore, the versions were evaluated
to reach agreement among themselves without any use of a separate standard of
correctness. After a carefully-controlled development involving reviews of the ver-
sions for discrepancies, the investigators found few functional differences between
the versions (which is not surprising given that the programmers were all given the
same design specification).
Examining the results obtained by the previous experiments reveals several char-
acteristics of n-version programming. First, the prevalence of coincident failures
(observed in every experiment conducted thus far) reduces the effectiveness of multi-
version voting in dealing with faults. Second, there appears to be substantial dif-
ficulty in getting versions to agree on a consensus result. Research has found that
even mathematically correct algorithms sometimes produce differing results due to
2These results are not reported in the published paper on the experiment, but were obtained
through personal communication with one of the authors.
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numeric instability [9]. Agreement concerns were cited in the decision by Avizienis,
Liu and Shiitz[5] to specify the algorithm to be used in their versions. However,
this solution essentially sacrifices the idea of version or design diversity, by limiting
it to the syntactic level, which may have only minor effect on software reliability.
Finally, analysis of the experiments shows that multi-version voting is a fault-
specific technique. Decisions on the portion of the system to be written in a multi-
version manner and on what algorithms are to be used in the different versions limit
the class of faults that these techniques are able to handle. The known problems in
handling missing-case logic faults indicate this specificity. What distinguishes this
technique from other fault-specific techniques is the lack of an explicit characteri-
zation of what faults are handled.
Much of the existing research on n-version programming has employed uncon-
trolled experimental designs. Claims have been made of improvements in reliability
due to these techniques in comparison with unverified software. This comparison is
unrealistic. The alternative to using multi-version voting is not to leave the software
unverified, but to apply other verification and validation techniques.
3 Experimental Design
A set of programs written from a single specification for a combat simulation prob-
lem are used in the study described in this paper. The specification is derived from
an industrial specification obtained from TRW[13]. The simulation is structured as
three sets of transformations from the input data to the output data. The first set
of transformations converts the input data to an abstract intermediate state. The
L3
intermediate state is updated by a second set of transformations in each cycle of
simulated time. After a number of cycles (specified in the input data), the output
data are produced by the third set of transformations from the final intermediate
state. Prototype implementations were developed by three individuals in order to
evaluate and improve the quality and comprehensibility of the requirements speci-
fication before the development of the versions began.
The experiment participants used throughout were upper-division computer sci-
ence students. One set of participants, students in a senior-level class on advanced
software engineering methods, performed all design and implementation activities
on the program versions. A disjoint set of participants attempted to detect faults
in the programs. All decisions on whether or not to report a section of code as a
fault were made by a student participant or a piece of software written by a student
participant. Once the reports were generated (by all techniques), the administra-
tor acted as final arbiter as to which reports identified faults and which were false
alarms; this decision was not reported to the students during their participation in
the experiment. All participants were trained in the techniques used in the experi-
ment; however, none had applied these specific techniques on any projects prior to
this experiment with the exception of previous Pascal programming experience by
the implementation participants.
The development activity involved 26 individuals, working in two-person teams.
Teams were assigned randomly. Of the 13 teams, 8 eventually produced versions
that were judged acceptable for use in the experiment. The development activity
involved preparing architectural and detailed designs for the software, coding the
software from those designs, and debugging the software sufficiently to pass the
1 !
version acceptance test. The version acceptance test was a set of 15 data sets. The
data sets were designed to execute each of the major portions of the code at least
once. The acceptance test was not, and was not intended to be, a basis for quality
assessment of the code, but rather was a test of whether all major portions of the
code were present in some operable form. The goal of the development procedure
was to have the versions in a state similar to that of normal software development
immediately prior to unit testing.
Table 1 describes the finished versions. The column marked 'Modules' shows the
number of Pascal procedures and functions in each version. The size of the source
is given in two figures, source lines and code lines, with the latter figure omitting
blank and comment lines. Finally, the complexity of each module in each version
was measured using McCabe's Cyclomatic Complexity, V(G). These figures are
profiled in the last three columns of the table. The minimum V(G) is omitted since
in each version there was at least one module that was strictly linear in structure
(no loops or branches), and thus has a V(G) of 1. The mean code length is 1777
lines, with a standard deviation of 435.
The experimental activity involved applying five different fault detection tech-
niques to the program versions: code reading by stepwise abstraction [25], static data
flow analysis, run-time assertions inserted by the development participants, multi-
version voting, and functional testing with follow-on structural testing. The code
reading was performed by eight individuals. Prior to code reading, all developer-
inserted comments were stripped from the version source code. Each version was
read by one person, and each person read only one version. The data-flow analysis
was performed by implementing and executing an analysis tool based on algorithms
15
Version Module V(G)
# Modules Source Lines Code Lines Mean Std. Dev. Max
1 72 7503 2414 4.671 6.844 47
2 56 3452 1540 3.055 4.125 13
3 41 1480 1201 3.698 5.549 25
4 57 3663 2003 4.825 5.282 21
5 28 1834 1544 7.694 13.011 58
6 72 3065 2206 2.868 3.423 16
7 75 2734 1978 3.427 5.084 28
8 57 1896 1331 2.193 2.503 10
Table 1: Version Source Profile
by Fosdick and Osterweil[14].
The development participants were trained in writing run-time assertions and
were required to include assertions in their versions. The run-time assertions were
present during the application of all techniques. If an assertion condition fails, a
message is generated.
A "gold" version has been written by the experiment administrator as an aid for
fault diagnosis, but this actually just provides another version to check against. In
fact, faults in the gold version have been detected. The gold version is not included
in the experimental data. It is, of course, possible that failures common to all
of the versions, including the gold, will not be detected. This is an unavoidable
consequence of this type of experiment.
To examine fault tolerance by voting, we chose three versions because more than
this number of versions would, in most cases, be totally unrealistic, and two-version
voting does not provide fault tolerance. When at least one version in a two-version
system provides an erroneous result, there is no chance of masking (or tolerating)
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that failure and either no answer or a wrong answer is provided. All versions were
executed on a set of 10,000 randomly-generated test cases. The test data generator
has been designed to provide realistic test cases according to an expected usage
profile in the operational environment.
Functional testing augmented by structural testing was performed on the pro-
grams. A series of 97 functional test-data sets were generated from the specification
by trained undergraduates. These data sets were planned using the abstract func-
tion technique described by Howden[20]. Part of each plan was a description of
the program instrumentation needed to view the output of each abstract function.
The structural coverage of the functional data-sets was measured using the ASSET
structural testing tool[15], and sufficient additional data sets were defined to bring
the coverage up to the all-predicate-uses level. The participants used a total of 60
additional data sets to achieve all-predicate-uses coverage in all procedures in all
versions. The number of data sets executed by each individual version varied from
5 to 13, as needed to achieve the required coverage.
Because some of the techniques applied to the programs are open-ended in terms
of possible application of resources, it was necessary to attempt to hold relatively
constant the resources allocated to each technique. This was not necessary for
those techniques, namely static data flow analysis and code reading, that have a
fixed and relatively low cost. Table 2 contains the amount of human hours and
computer hours devoted to each technique. The time devoted to software testing
and voting is approximately two calendar months per version for both.
In general, the student participants took their efforts seriously and performed
careful work in this experiment. In the code reading, the average rate of analysis
17
Computer Hours Human Hours
Technique Mean SD Min. Max. Mean SD Min. Max.
Code Reading 36 15 19 60
Static Analysis 40 30 0.5 104 1 0.1 0.75 1.25
Software Test 84 63 36 219 373 4 366 378
Voting 1415 1055 600 3692 6 14 8
Table 2: Hours Devoted to Each Technique Per Version
and annotation was 70 lines per hour. Analysis of the annotations shows that the
students were reading in depth and not simply skimming the source listings. In the
functional test planning, similar attention to detail was displayed by the students.
It is possible for test plans to be of variable quality, so three outside industrial
experts evaluated the plans in an attempt to gauge the plan quality before testing
the versions. In their opinion the plans, while obviously not the work of experienced
professionals, were comparable to those used in many industrial settings.
4 Results
Two general categories of questions have guided our analysis of the data. The first
is a comparison between fault elimination and fault-tolerance techniques, i.e., are
they substitutes for each other or do they complement each other. The second
category of questions involves comparing various testing techniques with respect to
fault detection, including consideration of their relative strengths and weaknesses
and how these techniques might be improved.
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4.1 Fault Tolerance and Fault Elimination
Before presenting the data, it is necessary to define some terms. In a three- version
voting system, there are three possible results: a correct answer is produced (there
are at least 2 programs in the triplet that produce correct answers), no answer is
produced (three different results are produced), or a wrong answer is agreed upon
(at least two programs produce identically wrong answers). If a correct answer
is produced despite the failure of one of the programs, then the triplet is fault
tolerant and the single error is masked. If no agreement is reached, then one could
say that the individual program failures were detected, but fault tolerance (run-
time masking) has not been achieved. In the third case, i.e., producing an incorrect
result, the failure is not detected and the faults have not been tolerated.
To examine whether fault-tolerance techniques are substitutes for fault-elimin-
ation techniques, we shall consider the faults tolerated by 3-version voting and
potentially tolerated by techniques using assertions. Note that the assertions them-
selves provide no fault recovery ability, but may be used in conjunction with either
forward or backward recovery strategies to tolerate faults once they are detected.
No recovery strategies were implemented in the programs used in this experiment.
This means that the results relating to assertions should be viewed as counts of
faults potentially tolerated (if the hypothetical recovery techniques were effective)
rather than faults actually tolerated. This contrasts with fault tolerance by voting,
where the same mechanism (a vote) is used to detect and tolerate faults. The results
in this section relating to voting are counts of faults actually tolerated by 3-version
voting in this experiment.
The first question that was investigated is whether run-time voting tolerated the
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faults detected by the fault-elimination techniques used, i.e, functional testing aug-
mented by some structural testing, code reading, and static analysis. This question
tests the previously-quoted hypothesis by Avizienis and Kelly[4] that multiversion
voting may reduce or replace traditional software V&V.
If voting tolerates the faults detected by testing, then elimination or reduction in
testing can possibly be justified, and testing could be completed while the software is
being used. However, if the faults detected by fault elimination are not tolerated by
voting at run-time, then testing cannot be eliminated. Furthermore, any argument
for reduction of testing would need to prove that the reduction in testing merely
results in the non-detection (and non-elimination) of the faults that voting will
reliably tolerate and does not result in the software containing faults causing run-
time failures that might have been detected and eliminated by increased testing.
There are two aspects to answering this question. The first is whether the same
faults are detected by the fault-elimination techniques and tolerated by voting. If
not, then testing cannot be eliminated and reduction of the amount of each type
of testing cannot be justified. However, testing can also be reduced by eliminating
just one type of testing. Therefore, it is also necessary to investigate whether one
particular type of testing is superfluous when using voting. The first aspect is
covered in the rest of this section of the paper; the second is discussed in the next
section where the faults detected by each technique are compared.
The programs were executed on 10,000 randomly-generated data sets. In general,
we found that the faults that were tolerated were not the same as the faults that were
detected by fault-elimination techniques. In addition, of the 56 total voting triplets,
none tolerated more than a relatively small fraction of the faults detected by the
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fault-elimination techniques. The best triplet tolerated only 41 faults (compared to
107 detected by all techniques in the versions (numbers 4, 5 and 6) that participated
in that triplet). All triplets were unreliable in tolerating even those faults they could
tolerate (i.e., those faults they tolerated at least once).
Table 3 shows the number and intersection of faults found by each class of tech-
nique, i.e., voting, assertions and the three fault-elimination techniques. Assertions
are included in the results that follow solely to better characterize the relationship
between the fault tolerance and fault-elimination approaches. Note the relatively
small number of faults that were both tolerated by voting and detected by a fault-
elimination technique (27, given by the sum of the last two lines of table 3). It is
also interesting to note that assertions and voting detected only a few of the same
faults. This supports the results by Leveson, Cha, Knight and Shimeall[24].
A second question involves the relationship between coincident failures and test-
ing. There has been speculation about whether the faults that result in coincident
failures (and thus reduce the fault-tolerance capability of voting systems) are likely
to be detected through testing procedures. Examination of the specific faults that
were detected by testing indicates that testing detected only 24 of the 103 common-
failure faults. Furthermore, the common-failure faults found by testing did not
include those faults that produced the majority of the common failures during the
executions. This result occurred despite the fact that some of the testing techniques
target the testing of special cases, which are often involved in common failures. This
result may indicate that the faults that reduce the effectiveness of n-version pro-
gramming are among the most difficult to detect. This is not surprising and satisfies
the intuitive explanation that the parts of the problem that lead to mistakes by the
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programmers may be equally difficult for the testers to handle. That is, humans
are unlikely to make mistakes in a random fashion.
Version
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total
Tolerated by vote 7 7 11 8 14 7 5 8 67
Detected by assertions only 4 3 1 8 2 2 4 4 28
Detected by fault elim. only 4 17 27 13 15 4 13 26 119
Both assert & fault elim. 7 1 1 3 6 3 21
Both assert Sz vote 2 1 2 3 8
Both vote k. fault elim. 2 3 3 2 4 5 2 21
Assert, vote &: fault elim. 1 1 2 1 1 6
Table 3: Number of Faults Tolerated or Detected
Finally, it is interesting to ask if there were any faults tolerated by run-time
voting that were not detected by the fault-elimination techniques. If so, then the
use of fault elimination does not preclude the use of fault tolerance, i.e., they are
complementary techniques rather than competitive techniques. Again, table 3 shows
that this did occur for 67 faults, although, as discussed in the rest of this section,
the average individual triplet tolerated 33 faults (of the 104 faults present in the
average individual triplet) and did not do this consistently. Firm conclusions cannot
be drawn from this data given the novice nature of the participants in the fault-
elimination efforts, but it does raise interesting questions for further study.
Voting actually did somewhat worse in comparison with testing than is indicated
by the data in table 3. In the table, run-time voting is credited with tolerating a
fault if it tolerates at least one failure caused by that fault even though it may not
tolerate every failure caused by the fault. It is also credited with tolerating a fault
if only one or several of the 56 combinations of versions tolerate it even though all
of them do not. The situation is different for fault elimination since the detection
of a fault by a fault-elimination technique leads to elimination of the fault prior to
production use of the software and elimination of all failures related to that fault. In
general, we found that even when the failure caused by a fault is at times tolerated
by a triplet, it is usually not tolerated every time, and there is wide variation among
the different triplets in terms of how effective they were in tolerating faults.
In order to show the variation, we computed the number of faults tolerated at
least once by a triplet divided by the total number of faults that caused a failure
in one of the versions comprising that triplet. This fraction ranged from 60.4% to
88.6% with an average of 75.9%3 and a standard deviation of 6.2%. That is, even
the best triplet missed 11% of the faults that it should have been able to tolerate.
Another way of looking at variability among triplets is to consider the conditional
probability that a triplet will mask a failure given that a failure occurs (i.e., the
conditional probability that a correct result is produced despite the failure of one
of the versions). This fraction was even lower, i.e., it ranged from 20.8% to 61.5%
with a mean of 37.9% and a standard deviation of 11.1% (see figure 1). On average
the triplets only tolerated faults 38% of the time that they caused a failure. This
can be explained by the large number of correlated failures that occurred.
4.2 Comparison of Fault-Detection Techniques
Some comparison of the fault-detection techniques is possible with this data, al-
though absolute numbers may not be important because of the problems of evalu-
3Note that these are percentages of the faults present in the three versions that constitute the
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Figure 1: Conditional Probability of Triplet Fault Masking
ating and keeping constant the amount of effort put into each technique. Further-
more, numbers are not really the issue; instead a more important question may be
whether different or similar faults are found by each technique. A technique may
only find one fault, but if that fault is not likely to be found in any other way, then
that technique may still need to be applied.
4.2.1 Definition of Terms
Before discussing the results, certain key concepts need to be clearly defined. In
particular, it is important to understand what a fault is and when it may be detected
by each technique. The IEEE standard defines a fault to be "an accidental condition
that causes a functional unit to fail to perform its required function." [1]
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If the correction of a section of code eliminates at least one failure, it is counted
as a single fault. Several faults could contribute to the failure for a given data set,
and several failures could be due to a single fault. For example, a single data set
could reveal separate faults dealing with battalion location and observation of one
battalion by another. If either of these faults were solely responsible for failures in
other data sets, they are counted as separate faults. If correction of either of these
faults eliminates the failure, they are counted as a single fault. This is because
faults may sometimes be due to actions distributed through the version code. For
example, if a failure results from the initialization code not ensuring an assumption
made in some calculation code, this is counted as only one fault, although it could
be corrected either by changing the initialization code to ensure the assumption or
by changing the calculation code to obviate the assumption.
For most of the techniques used in this experiment, determination of when the
techniques detected faults is straightforward. Static analysis and code reading iden-
tify the fault precisely to the section of code in which it occurs. A run-time assertion
generates reports when faults produce an erroneous run-time state. Testing detects
a fault when the test-failure conditions are satisfied due to behavior caused by a
fault. The test-failure conditions are explicitly given in the functional test plans
and are developed as part of the test data during the structural testing. Faults
detected during analysis of the version source code to formulate the structural test
data are also considered detected by structural testing.
For back-to-back testing, the conditions when a fault is detected are less clear.
We define a fault as detected if the version containing it is identified as erroneous
because its answer differs from a majority of the versions. For example, if a triplet
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produces Good- Good-Bad results, then the fault responsible for producing the Bad
output will be counted as detected. However, Bad-Bad-Good (where the two Bad
results are identical) will not count as a fault detection because a fault has not
been identified in the incorrect version, but instead the correct version has been
erroneously identified as containing a fault. That is, a fault is counted as detected
if the voting process isolates the version that is faulty. As another example, Badl-
Badl-Bad2 would count as only one fault detection (the fault responsible for the
Bad2 output) while Badl-Bad2-Bad3 would count as three faults detected since all
three versions would need to be debugged.
It could be argued that Badl-Badl-Bad2 would actually result in finding two
or three faults because in trying to fix the Bad2 fault, the Badl would eventually
be found. However, we feel that once a fault is located and fixed in the Bad2
version, the debuggers would probably stop. The same type of argument could be
made in the Bad-Bad-Good case where eventually the debuggers might stumble
onto the faults causing the Bad results when they gave up attempting to fix the
Good program. This seems to us to be overly optimistic. The tendency will be to
try to get the single answer to match the multiple answer rather than vice versa.
In fact, there were occasions when we temporarily "broke" a correct version when
trying to debug it and get it to match the majority result. We felt that to count a
fault detection technique as detecting a fault, it should at least identify the program
that has failed. This decision is arbitrary, but seemed to make the most sense to
the authors.
Two-version voting detects faults if the pair disagree as to the result. Good-Bad
is counted as detecting the fault that caused the Bad answer, and Badl-Bad2 is
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counted as detecting the two faults that caused the two distinct bad results. One
side effect of this decision is that all faults detected by three- version voting are also
(by definition) detected by two-version voting, but the converse is not true.
We assumed that many more test cases can be executed when using back-to-
back testing with random generation of test cases because of the lack of necessity
to apply an independent validation procedure to the outputs although there is also
a necessity to write a test-harness program to implement the voting. Writing a test
harness is not necessarily a trivial problem when real numbers are involved since
different correct results are possible from different (correct) algorithms due to the
use of limited- precision arithmetic. Using a tolerance for the comparisons will not
solve the problem [9]. In previous experiments, this consistent comparison problem
has resulted in time-consuming debugging of correct programs.
The reader should note that we are now reinterpreting our experimental proce-
dures. In the previous section, we identified the execution of the 10,000 input cases
as a simulation of the production use of the software. We are now interpreting this
procedure as a fault-elimination technique that would precede the actual produc-
tion use of the programs. There is no problem with this from a practical standpoint
since the procedures are identical and differ only in the time they are performed,
but it may be confusing to the reader.
27
4.2.2 Fault Detection Summary
Table 4 shows the number of faults detected by each technique4 . The first five lines
(those marked 'only') give the number of faults detected by each technique that
were detected by none of the other techniques (e.g., run-time assertions detected
a total of 23 faults that were not detected by voting, testing, static analysis or
code reading). The remainder of the table gives the number of faults detected in
common by the techniques named on each line (e.g., code reading found a total of 4
faults that were also found by run-time assertions, but were not found by any other
technique).
The voting technique used in constructing table 4 was two-version voting. Three-
version voting detected 112 of the 123 faults found by two-version voting. These
faults were found by voting with the eight versions combined into the 28 possible
pairs and the 56 possible triplets. The values in the line marked 'Voting detection
only' table 4 are the maximum and minimum of the faults detected by each two-
version voting pair for each version. A range exists for voting because it was applied
to each version 7 times (the number of two-version voting systems in which each
version participated) while the other techniques were only applied once. In all other
voting cases (voting in combination with each of the other techniques), there were
no variations in the number of faults detected. The interesting feature of table 4 is
not the precise values shown (which depend on the application), but that most of
the faults detected by each technique were found by no other technique.
4 Note that the figures in table 3 and table 4 are not comparable due to: a) the difference
between fault detection by voting and fault tolerance by voting and b) the difference between
2-version and 3-version voting
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Version
Method 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total
Testing only



































Assertions only 3 3 1 8 1 1 3 3 23
Static analysis only 2 2
Both 2-v. voting & test













Both assertions & 2-v. voting 2 2 4 4 12
Both reading &; assertions 2 1 1 4
Both static analysis &; 2-v. voting 1 1 2
Both reading & 2-v. voting 2 2
Both reading & test 1 1
Both static analysis & test 1 1
Assert k, 2-v. voting Sz test 1 1 2 1 5
Reading & 2-v. voting fc test 2 2 4
Table 4: Number of Faults Detected
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4.2.3 Variation in Voting Performance
To give some feeling about the variability of the voting performance, two sets of
statistics are provided. The first set is the number of faults detected at least once
by each pair and each triplet, divided by the total number of faults that caused at
least one failure in the versions making up the system (i.e., the fraction of revealed
faults that each voting system detected). For the 28 two-version voting systems,
the fraction of faults detected varies from 91.3% to 100% with a mean of 97.9% and
a standard deviation of 2.6%. For the 56 three-version voting systems, the fraction
of faults detected varies among the triplets from 90.5% to 100% with a mean of
96.5% and a standard deviation of 2.5%. In short, the majority of pairs and triplets
fail to detect at least some of the faults revealed by the input data. Since virtually
all systems would be developed with at most one pair or triplet, the data in table 4
represents a best case for voting.
The second set of statistics used to analyze the variation in fault detection is
the conditional probability that a pair or triplet detects each fault given that it
is revealed. The mean of these probabilities over all faults detected for each two-
version system varies between 0.826 and 0.981, with a mean of 0.934 and a standard
deviation of 0.040 (see figure 2). In other words, voting with a two-version system
never detected all of the failures of the component versions. Voting with the major-
ity of two-version systems failed to detect 5% or more of the version failures. For
the three-version voting systems, the mean of the conditional probabilities over all
faults detected by each system varied from 0.787 to 0.953 with a mean of 0.886.
(see figure 3). This indicates that there is a considerable chance that three-version
back-to-back testing will fail to identify erroneous versions. On the average, this
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Figure 2: Two- Version Conditional Probability of Detection
4.2.4 Back-To-Back Testing
There are two particularly interesting comparisons to make that deal with currently
unresolved issues in testing research. The first is the use of back-to-back testing
vs. the use of other testing oracles (i.e., those not involving a voting procedure).
Back-to-back testing allows a large amount of data to be executed due to the au-
tomated nature of the oracle, and it has been advocated as a way of extensively
testing complex software where determining a correct answer by a non-voting pro-
cedure may be tedious and time-consuming[7, 8, 28, 31]. Of course, if one takes a
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Figure 3: Three- Version Conditional Probability of Detection
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of producing multiple versions of the software. However, if back-to-back testing is
much more effective then the cost arguments may be irrelevant.
There were 78 faults that were detected by the voting procedure that were not
detected by any other technique. Better implementation of the other testing tech-
niques or the use of different testing techniques might have found more faults, but
this would have to be proven either way. Even given the novice nature of the par-
ticipants in the other testing procedures, they did find 153 faults that were not
detected by the back-to-back testing. 45 faults were detected in common. There
were faults that did not cause failures on the randomly-generated test data and
therefore could not possibly have been detected by the back-to-back testing, but
were found by the techniques that do not require failure to detect faults.
Our data suggests that using back-to-back testing on randomly-generated data is
not an acceptable testing procedure by itself. A related question is whether better
results are obtained by doing the back-to-back testing on both randomly-generated
test cases and functionally-generated test cases. This separates the issue of test
data generation from the issue of using voting as a test oracle. We executed the 56
triplets on the functionally-generated and structurally-generated test cases and did
not detect any additional faults. This implies that the problem is not necessarily in
the test case generation method, but in the identification of errors by voting, i.e.,
by the limitations of using voting as a test oracle.
4.2.5 Types of Faults Detected
To examine the fault detection behavior of the techniques further, the types of faults
detected by each were profiled and compared. Because there is no widely accepted
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detailed taxonomy for fault classification, a 13 class fault taxonomy was developed
and used. This fault taxonomy is described in table 5. Since this taxonomy was
developed to differentiate between the sets of actual faults detected by the various
techniques (i.e., developed after examining the faults in an attempt to distinguish
them), significance tests on these classifications are inappropriate. In the following
discussion, a statement that a technique detected faults in a particular class does not
imply that the technique detected all faults of that class. For example, the statement
that voting detected missing-thread faults should not be interpreted as indicating
that all missing-thread faults located in the versions were detected by voting. Two
of the categories in this fault taxonomy (Overrestriction faults and Data-Structure
faults) are not mentioned in the text that follows since these categories do not
provide a basis for characterizing the differences observed in fault detection by the
various techniques.
Code Reading by Stepwise Abstraction
Code reading by stepwise abstraction on uncommented code found calculation
faults, missing-check faults, branch-condition faults and missing-branch faults. The
participants did not find large global pieces of missing code or missing threads of
logic that ran through the entire program.
Analysis of the experiment data lent insight into two questions related to the
use of code reading in software development. The first of these questions is what
conditions lead code reading to fail to detect faults. While code reading detected
a number of faults, it failed to detect the majority of faults. Identification of the
causes of this non-detection suggests ways to improve code reading to broaden its
effectiveness. One reason for the failure of code reading to detect certain faults was
M
Class Comments Detecting Technique
Overrestriction E.g., forcing all weather to move
north-east, rejecting legal input
Assert, Read,
Test, Vote
Loop Condition E.g., infinite loop Vote, Assert, Test
Calculation Incorrect formula Read
Initialization Variable not initialized Stat. Analysis, Test
Substitution Wrong variable used Vote, Assert
Missing check Exceptional case not handled
E.g., divide by zero
Read
Branch Condition Bad condition on a branch Vote, Read, Test
Missing Branch Localized missing code to detect
and handle specific conditions
in normal execution
Read, Test








Ordering Operations in wrong order
(e.g., updating value before use)
Vote, Test
Parameter Reversal Actual parameter order permuted
with respect to formal parameter
Vote, Assert
Data Structure E.g., linked list becomes circular Vote, Test,
Read, Assert
Table 5: Fault Taxonomy
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the omission of needed detail in the abstractions constructed by the participants.
Another condition that seemed difficult to detect was missing code. The code-
reading participants detected missing-branch faults (i.e., where the set of cases
handled by the code did not cover all possible cases at a specific point), but failed
to detect those cases where larger or more widespread code was omitted.
A second question of interest in examining the code-reading results is what condi-
tions lead the code-reading participants to erroneously report code as faulty. These
erroneous reports seemed to occur when the readers were mislead by the code. Pre-
venting such misdirection may help to improve the detection performance of code
reading. Use of commented code for the code reading might have prevented some of
this misdirection of the readers, however it might also have lead to different types
of misdirection. For example, it is equally possible that the readers would report
code as erroneous when it conflicted with the comments (e.g., where the develop-
ment participants corrected the code, but not the comments describing the code).
Another possibility is that the readers would have failed to detect as many faults,
e.g., if they summarized the comments instead of the code and thus duplicated
the faulty assumptions made by the development participants. In an effort to avoid
these problems, as well as the inherent inequality of information based on the widely
varying amounts of comments in the version source code (see table 1), all comments
were stripped from the versions before the readers were given them.
Analysis of the annotations written by the code readers indicates that false alarms
arose from code that was difficult to abstract. For example, an erroneous fault report
was generated for a procedure with a large number of arguments that was called
in several places in the code. Some of the formal parameters were used in different
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ways in the procedure (depending on the value of other formal parameters), and
this led to misconceptions on the part of the reader. False alarms also occurred
when abandoned implementation strategies (blind alleys during development) are
reflected in the code. For example, the readers erroneously reported several faults in
cases where the name of a variable conflicts with the manner in which the variable is
used. Annotations by the code readers in such situations indicate that they focused
on syntactic factors rather than the program semantics. These results suggest that
experience and improved training may help reduce erroneous reports from code
reading.
Static Data-Flow Analysis
Static data-flow analysis found only initialization faults. Three faults were found
by this technique that were not detected by any other. Upon examination, it was
determined that the compiler and operating system versions being used happened to
initialize to zero the particular storage locations where the programs were loaded,
and these variables were used for counters and needed to be initialized to zero.
Obviously, this cannot be counted on in future versions of these support programs
so these are real and important faults to detect.
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Voting
Voting found missing- thread faults, parameter-reversal faults, substitution faults,
ordering faults and faults (subsets of loop-condition and data-structure faults) caus-
ing abends (which, despite their cause, are obviously found by any of the techniques
that involve executing the code over a large number of test cases).
It is interesting to consider the faults that were not found by voting, i.e., those
that were so highly correlated that the faults were masked by the voting procedure.
For the most part, these were missing-branch faults. This is consistent with past ex-
periments, which have all reported that missing-logic errors are poorly tolerated by
multi-version systems. Testing strategies, such as functional and structural testing,
that examine special cases as well as typical cases were more successful at finding
missing-branch faults. As discussed above, performing back-to-back testing on the
test cases derived for functional testing did not solve the problem since the common
faults masked the identification of the fault even though the programs failed.
Another unmasked fault involved the use of a wrong subscript. This is puzzling
as the same thing happened in a previous experiment [10]. We cannot currently
find any other explanation aside from coincidence although we are in the process of
attempting to determine if an explanation exists.
Run-Time Assertions
Run-time assertions found parameter- reversal faults, substitution faults and
faults causing abends. They did not detect any of the four classes of missing-
code faults. We are not very confident about the data for run-time assertions
as the programmers involved did not have any experience in writing exception
or error-detection code, and our subjective evaluation of their assertions is that
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they were, in general, quite poor. All of the run-time assertions used were sim-
ple range or specific value tests (e.g., run-time assertions to check if the variable
Params .NumWeatherEvents lies between and the constant MaxWeather, or if point-
ers are non-nil). In fact, examination of the design documents show cases where the
development participants anticipated faults that actually occurred in their code,
but (for reasons known only to them) they omitted assertions to check for these
faults.
Each pair of development participants added assertions to their version to check
if battalions left the simulated battlefield, and these assertions detected the errors
that were generated when this occurred. Two of the eight versions placed range
restrictions on internally-calculated values, and further faults were detected by these
assertions in each of these versions.
The simple check strategy used and the failure by the majority of the development
teams to place assertions to check internal results left many errors undetected.
However, despite these weaknesses simple range checks detected faults. These checks
detected 23 faults that were found in no other manner. The fact that assertions
detected faults that voting did not is consistent with the results of our previous
study of assertion effectiveness [24]. It appears that even a cursory set of assertions
has some value, and this suggests that it would be useful to perform further work to
examine the effectiveness of a thorough set of assertions for fault detection (possibly
using an automated strategy).
Functional and Structural Testing
Functional and structural testing identified ordering faults, missing-branch faults,
unimplemented-requirement faults and missing-thread faults. They also detected
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faults causing abends (as did all the techniques that involved executing the pro-
grams). Structural testing detected further missing-code faults, in particular faults
involving variables that were initialized in a manner that in rare cases conflicted
with the manner in which those variables were used.
Structural testing failed to detect several missing-thread faults that were found
by other techniques (such as voting). The incompleteness seemed largely due to
the module-by-module nature of the testing tool used. That is, the prototype
version of ASSET used in this experiment measures the coverage achieved by the
input data on each module individually, with no consideration of data flow between
modules. The versions contain several instances where global data structures are
initialized in one module, updated in a second module and used in calculations in
several other modules. While all of the initialization paths and all of the update
paths are covered by the test data, not all of the update paths are covered for each
initialization path. Therefore, several of the missing-code faults eluded detection in
our structural testing.
Examination of the functionally-specified test data sets showed that faults were
revealed only by those data sets that contained atypical data (i.e., those tests that
exercised special cases in the versions or odd combinations of the functions sup-
ported by the code). This result supports a recommended practice in the field of
software testing.
Additional Comparisons of Fault Detection Techniques
Two general attributes accounted for much of the observed variation of effective-
ness: the ability of the techniques to examine internal states and the scope of their
evaluation.
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One reason voting failed to detect some faults was that it was not able to examine
internal program states. The other techniques do not share this limitation. For code
reading and static analysis, examination of the internal state involves evaluation
of the program source code. Functional testing identifies and evaluates internal
abstract functions. Assertions evaluate specific internal conditions at the locations
where they are inserted. Because the voting systems examine only final states, they
fail to identify faults that occur, but are concealed by later processing.
Tso and others argue that voting may be performed on internal program states,
as in the cross-check analysis technique[32]. However, the programs in this ex-
periment are quite diverse. The internal program states differ significantly in the
algorithms and data structures employed. A single value in the internal state of
one program may indeed be a single value in another program, but more often it is
either a function of several values or not present at all (unneeded in the alternate
algorithm used in the second program). Furthermore, since the order of the pro-
grams' operations are also quite diverse, there is no single time except initialization
and production of the final result at which any correspondence in values could be
compared by voting. To allow voting on internal program states requires specifi-
cation of the algorithm and data structures used in the internal states, effectively
eliminating any significant design diversity and thus eliminating the ability to detect
design errors.
A second important attribute is the scope of evaluation. The scope over which
assertions and code reading examine the system state appears to be the key char-
acteristic limiting the detection of faults by those techniques. Assertions examine
the system state at specific points in the execution. If a fault has not yet occurred
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at those points, or if the fault's effect is masked, the assertion does not detect the
fault. The use of code reading by stepwise abstraction on the uncommented form
of these programs did not detect certain faults because the process of abstraction
did not maintain sufficient detail. For example, an assumption by the coder might
be violated by the faulty code, but the assumption is not preserved through several
layers of abstractions made by the reader between the initialization and the calcu-
lation code. The purpose of abstraction is to keep the amount of information at a
manageable level, but over-abstraction limits the effectiveness of code reading.
5 Conclusions
It is important to consider several caveats when drawing conclusions from the data
presented in this paper. First, experts in the various techniques were not used.
Students get a lot of experience in programming while in school, but they seldom
receive adequate exposure to and practice with testing and other fault-elimination
techniques. We gave them training, but that is not a substitute for experience.
Furthermore, only one method was applied within each category of fault-elimination
techniques; the particular method chosen may not have been the most effective.
Finally, our program may not be representative of a large number of applications
and the particular software development procedures also may not be representative.
Despite these limitations (which unfortunately are inherent in this type of exper-
imentation), useful information can be derived from this study. In the few instances
where there is other experimental evidence, our results tend to support and confirm
previous findings. Where almost no experimental evidence is available, our results
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represent one data point that can be used to focus and direct future experiments.
This experiment is the first to investigate the relationship between fault-elim-
ination techniques and software fault tolerance. We found that our data does not
support the hypotheses that multi-version voting is a substitute for functional test-
ing, that testing can be reduced when using this software fault-tolerance technique,
nor that testing can proceed in conjunction with operational use of the software
in an n-version programming system where high reliability is required. Instead,
we found that multi-version voting did not tolerate most of the faults detected by
the fault-elimination techniques. Although we also found that multi-version voting
tolerated different faults than were detected by the fault-elimination techniques, no
firm conclusions should be drawn from this because of doubts about the ability of
the novices involved and the limitations of the fault elimination techniques used;
further investigation is suggested.
This experiment examines a broad set of fault detection techniques in a compar-
ative manner. While the presence of multiple versions can speed the execution of
large numbers of randomly generated cases, our results cast doubt on the effective-
ness of using voting as a test oracle. Testing procedures that allow instrumenting
the code to examine internal states were much more effective. When comparing
fault-elimination methods, we found that the intersection of the sets of faults found
by each method was relatively small. Examination of the faults allowed us to cat-
egorize the types found by each method and, in some cases, to explain why these
results occurred.
This experiment raises questions with respect to several of the techniques exam-
ined. The detection capability of code reading appears to be reduced in comparison
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to earlier results such as those reported by Basili and Selby[6] (who used smaller
programs). Additional research is needed to distinguish the effects of program size
and complexity on the effectiveness of code reading. Analysis of the faults not de-
tected shows that there is a need to develop extensions to code reading techniques
that better characterize global effects. One way of accomplishing this might be to
mix a top-down code reading technique with the bottom-up methodology of code
reading by stepwise abstraction. Further investigation of this seems worthwhile.
The static data flow analysis technique used in this study is limited in the type
of faults it can potentially detect. However, several of the faults found by this tech-
nique were found by no other technique, and so applying it in software development
may be worthwhile, particularly given its relatively low cost of application. There
ma\- also be language or environmental factors that reduced the number of undefined
reference faults in this particular software. For example, the requirement of declar-
ing all variables in Pascal may serve as a reminder to initialize variables before use.
Other static analysis techniques, such as associating physical units with variable
values and analyzing the software to see if the units are appropriately preserved[21]
deserve further exploration. These types of static analysis techniques would permit
examination of the legality of usage rather than just the presence of initialization
and reference.
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